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THE KENNETH M. PIPER LECTURESHIP SERIES
The Kenneth M. Piper Lectureship Series is dedicated to the memory
of Mr. Kenneth M. Piper, who made substantial contributions to the
fields of personnel management and labor relations during more than
two decades of service with Motorola, Inc. and Bausch & Lomb, Inc.
The Lecture Series is funded by the Kenneth M. Piper Endowment,
established by a gift from Mrs. Kenneth M. Piper in memory of her
husband. Major Programs in labor law are presented each year at the
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MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES: CONNECTING 
DOMESTIC LAW WITH INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS
LANCE COMPA
Note: This article is based on the author’s Kenneth M. Piper Lecture at 
the IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, March 22, 2016
I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. immigration policy is a matter of domestic law (distinct from ref-
ugee policy, which is grounded in international treaties). This paper asks 
whether and how immigration policy makers and advocacy groups in the 
United States might take into account international standards on migrant 
labor. These standards appear in United Nations, International Labor Or-
ganization, and international trade agreement provisions on rights and pro-
tections for migrant workers. I do not argue that international standards 
should override or substitute for U.S. law. Rather, they should inform poli-
cy makers and advocacy groups’ work in crafting immigration law and 
policy changes.
Following this introduction, Part II summarizes current debates and 
policy divides on migrant labor in the United States regarding both docu-
mented and undocumented workers from abroad. It also notes the absence 
of international labor and human rights considerations in most U.S. policy 
discourse, reflecting a broader “American exceptionalism” strain.
Part III examines three principal international instruments on migrant 
labor: the United Nations’ International Convention on Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,1 the Inter-
national Labour Organization’s (“ILO”) Convention No. 97 concerning 
Migration for Employment (Revised 1949),2 and ILO Convention No. 143 
concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equali-
1. U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 69th plen. mtg. at 261, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Dec. 18, 1990), G.A. 
Res. 45/158. 
2. Convention Concerning Migration for Employment (ILO No. 97), July 1, 1949, 120 U.N.T.S. 
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ty of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (1975).3 In 2006, the 
ILO consolidated key provisions of these instruments in a Multilateral 
Framework on Labour Migration,4 subtitled “[n]on-binding principles and 
guidelines for a rights-based approach to labor migration” (emphasis on 
“non-binding”).
Rather than a lengthy parsing of these texts, this article will explore 
their common features and their relevance to current migrant labor debates 
and policy discourse. This part continues with a review of migrant labor 
treatment in the United States that arguably runs afoul of international 
standards.
Part IV moves to a review of experience with migrant labor provisions 
of trade agreements—mainly the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA),5 the only one that specifically addresses migrant workers’
rights. As binding international documents, these trade agreements affect 
U.S. law and policy. Sometimes, the effect is direct, as when NAFTA cre-
ated new visa categories allowing more cross-border movement.6 But ef-
fects can also be indirect, as when NAFTA’s supplemental labor agreement 
included protection of migrant workers as one of its “labor principles.”7
This gave rise to several complaints and cases under the NAFTA labor 
agreement, demonstrating both its potential and its limitations.
Part V reviews arguments for taking into account international stand-
ards and applying a human rights framework in our domestic legal dis-
course, and concludes with a set of policy recommendations.
II. OVERVIEW OF MIGRANT LABOR POLICIES AND DEBATES
A. Moving “Talent”
Governments around the world have expanded commercial relations
through trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties, and other moves to 
attract investment and to promote exports of goods and trade in services. 
However, the expansion of movement of goods, services, and money does 
3. Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of 
Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (ILO No. 143), June 24, 1975, 1120 U.N.T.S. 323 
[hereinafter ILO No. 143].
4. See Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, at 33 (2006), 
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/publications/WCMS_178672/lang—en/index.htm.
5. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,,32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
6. See id. at 664-70.
7. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Annex 1, ¶11, opened for signature Sept. 
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not extend to people. As Richard Freeman notes, “[t]rade and international 
capital flows are a larger proportion of activity in goods and capital mar-
kets than immigration is in labor markets, presumably because govern-
ments have reduced trade barriers and liberalized capital markets, but have
not lowered barriers to immigration.”8
Defining and controlling borders are seen as essential to sovereignty. 
Governments are less willing to cede decision-making on immigration 
policy to international bodies. In the great exception to this trend, the Euro-
pean Union has made free movement of people among member countries a 
fourth pillar of economic integration alongside goods, services and capital. 
But the EU’s “free movement” pillar faces enormous pressure in the wake 
of the United Kingdom’s June 2016 “Brexit” vote.9
Freed-up movement of capital, goods, and services carries with it a 
demand for freed-up movement of “talent”—people applying their skills to 
generate more wealth in a globalized economy. How wealth is distributed 
and shared is a question beyond the scope of this paper. But the movement 
of talent across borders is a key factor in producing the wealth.
The term “talent” should not be limited to executives, professionals, 
“outstanding ability” O-visa holders, and those in the vaunted STEM fields 
(science, technology, engineering, mathematics). The word properly at-
taches to all workers who bring skill, care, and responsibility to their tasks. 
And that means all workers.
In upstate New York, mostly undocumented migrant workers apply 
their talent to the year-round care of dairy herds and milk production. Their 
work has proven to be a boon to the state’s economy, especially with the 
rise of Greek-style yogurt. The same holds true for those caring for upstate 
apple orchards, Finger Lakes vineyards, and other agricultural production, 
both year-round and at harvest time.
In other parts of the country, millions of immigrant workers—again, 
many of them undocumented—apply skill, care, and responsibility in a 
broad range of industries. These sectors include meatpacking and poultry 
(starting with care not to cut themselves and others wielding sharp knives 
in close quarters at rapid line speeds); construction, forestry and landscap-
ing; hotels and restaurants and amusement parks; and other sectors where 
8. Richard B. Freeman, People Flows in Globalization 9, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12315, 2006), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.464.5626&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
9. See Alan Travis, Fear of Immigration Drove The Leave Victory – Not Immigration Itself, THE
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immigrant workers’ labor powers economic activity. Migrant workers, 
documented and undocumented, play a key role in important economic 
sectors in the Chicago regional economy.10
What Maria Lorena Cook describes as “the conflict and tensions be-
tween sovereignty of the nation-state and the cross-border flows character-
istic of a global economy”11 generate currents that politicians, policy 
makers, and interest groups around the globe are trying to navigate. Not 
least here in the United States, where on one side candidates for office set a 
harsh anti-immigrant tone, while others support comprehensive immigra-
tion reform and decry deportations breaking up families and sending wom-
en and children back to violence-ridden countries.12
B. Competing Realities
Contradictory approaches also mark views of employer and employee 
advocates, who appear to inhabit separate universes. For many employers, 
the United States suffers a dearth of talent. The U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, the Essential Worker Immigration Coalition, ImmigrationWorks 
USA, CompeteAmerica and other industry and trade associations insist that 
we are in desperate need of more immigrant workers to meet labor shortag-
es and keep the economy growing.13 The American Immigration Council 
asserts that immigrant employees with H-1B visas do not pull down wages 
of American high-tech workers; they make higher salaries than American 
counterparts.14
10. See, e.g., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRANTS HELP SUSTAIN CHICAGO’S ECONOMY 2
(2002), http://216.92.33.26/special-reports/immigrants-help-sustain-chicagos-economy.
11. Maria Lorena Cook, The Advocate’s Dilemma: Framing Migrant Rights in National Settings,
4 STUD. SOC. JUST. 145, 145 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Miriam Valverde, Compare the Candidates: Clinton vs. Trump on Immigration,
POLITIFACT (July 15, 2016, 2:46 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2016/jul/15/compare-candidates-clinton-vs-trump-immigration/. 
13. See, e.g., CompeteAmerica, et. al., Debunking the Myth that Immigration Harms America,
http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/directory/DocumentSIA/Workforce/19%20Associations
%20Immigration%20Myth%20Facts%203-2015.pdf (last visited January 27, 2016); MICROSOFT CORP., 
A NAT’L TALENT STRATEGY: IDEAS FOR SECURING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS AND ECON. GROWTH 1,
https://news.microsoft.com/download/presskits/citizenship/MSNTS.pdf (last visited January 27, 2016); 
STUART ANDERSON, NATIONAL. FOUNDATION. FOR AMERICAN. POLICY., SETTING THE RECORD 
STRAIGHT ON HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRATION 1–2, 5, 9, 26 (2016), http://nfap.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Setting-the-Record-Straight-on-High-Skilled-Immigration.NFAP-Policy-
Brief.August-20162.pdf. 
14. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE H-1B VISA PROGRAM: A PRIMER ON THE 
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In their various publications just noted, these pro-immigration advo-
cates call for lifting the cap on H-1B “specialty occupation” visas and ex-
panding use of L “intracompany transfer” visas for high-tech and other 
high-skilled employees. They want to make H-2A and H-2B visas for 
“low-tech” temporary agricultural and non-agricultural jobs available for 
year-round work, not just seasonal labor. They want to ease what they see 
as overly burdensome prevailing wage and adverse effect wage require-
ments, job posting requirements, travel cost payments, work guarantees and 
other conditions employers must meet to engage H-1B, L, H-2A and H-2B 
workers. In March 2016, their views were reflected by the government of 
India, which filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization charging 
that U.S. visa requirements for H-1B employees violated WTO trade 
rules.15
A recent Financial Times article suggested that there is such a labor 
shortage in the construction industry that employers now sponsor migrant 
workers for U.S. citizenship to retain them.16 But the same article reported 
(apparently oblivious to connecting the dots) that employers complaining 
about labor shortage are resolutely non-union and pay workers as little as 
$10 an hour for dangerous, demanding physical labor.17
Trade unions, employee associations, and other worker advocates take 
a polar opposite view. They argue that what employers see as burdensome 
requirements, such as demonstrating unsuccessful attempts to recruit Amer-
ican workers as a condition of approval for using guest worker visas, are 
easily evaded by employers and weakly enforced by government regula-
tors.18 Research by Ben A. Rissing shows that Department of Labor offi-
cials over-rely on employers’ “attestations” of labor shortages (taking their 
word for it, without back-up evidence) and end up granting more temporary 
visas at times of high unemployment.19
15. See Matthew Dalton, India Challenges U.S. Worker Visa Fees at WTO: Complaint Addresses 
Increase in Fees for Temporary Visas Available for Highly Skilled Workers, WALL ST. J. (March 4, 
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/india-challenges-u-s-temporary-visa-scheme-at-wto-1457091168.
16. See Gary Silverman, Workers Wanted: Construction Sector Fights to Retain Foreign-Born 
Employees With Citizenship Schemes and Other Incentives, FIN. TIMES (February 8, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/46f78afc-ce4d-11e5-831d-09f7778e7377.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Ken Bensinger et. al., The Pushovers: Bar None: Abusing Foreign “Guest Work-
ers,” Stealing Their Wages, Even Threatening Their Lives: There Is Almost No Workplace Offense so
Extreme that the U.S. Government Will Not Reward Employers with the Chance to Do It Again,
BUZZFEED (May 12, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/kenbensinger/the-
pushovers?utm_term=.gy0Vad90Z#.ojwaNJQ26. 
19. See Ben A. Rissing & Emilio J. Castilla, Testing Attestations: U.S. Unemployment and Immi-
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Labor advocates insist that the alleged labor shortage is itself a myth.20
They say that employers claim a lack of home-grown talent to justify bring-
ing large numbers of immigrant employees into the workforce to replace 
American workers, save on labor costs, and maintain a docile workforce 
fearful of jeopardizing their visa status. Moreover, use of temporary visas 
puts downward pressure on the wages of U.S. workers who manage to hold 
onto their jobs.21
Each side in this debate musters myriad studies and reports to support 
its view and to influence public opinion and the policy debate in Con-
gress.22 As Kati Griffith summarizes:
At the heart of much of the current debate surrounding both skilled and 
unskilled migrant workers in the United States is whether, and to what
extent, these workers have an effect on the wages and working condi-
tions of domestic workers. Studies on the effect of immigrant workers on
labor standards for domestic workers arrive at “contradictory conclu-
sions.” Some find that migrant workers have increasingly “caused a ma-
jor competitive problem” for U.S. workers and may have reduced wage 
rates of some domestic workers. Others point out that, at the aggregate 
level, migrant workers do not negatively affect labor conditions for do-
mestic workers. Much of this debate centers on “whether low-income 
[domestic] workers are hurt a lot or just a little.” While the direct causal 
relationship between the presence of migrants and declining labor stand-
ards in the U.S. remains hotly contested, there is no doubt that many mi-
grant workers, especially undocumented migrant workers, are 
concentrated in low-wage workplaces where workplace rights are poorly 
followed and poorly enforced.23
The H-2B visa program apparently fails to protect hundreds of travel-
ing carnival workers whose jobs are controlled by a spurious “union” run 
20. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. TEITELBAUM, FALLING BEHIND? BOOM, BUST, AND THE GLOBAL RACE 
FOR SCIENTIFIC TALENT (Princeton Univ. Press 2014).
21. See Hal Salzman et. al., The Bogus High-Tech Worker Shortage: How Guest Workers Lower 
U.S. Wages, PBS NEWSHOUR: MAKING SENSE (July 24, 2013, 1:05PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/the-bogus-high-tech-worker-sho/.
22. On the labor shortage side, see, e.g., ADAMS B. NAGER & ROBERT D. ATKINSON, DEBUNKING 
THE TOP TEN ARGUMENTS AGAINST HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRATION (2015), http://www2.itif.org/2015-
debunking-myths-high-skilled.pdf (accessed January 27, 2016); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE &
IMMIGRATIONWORKS USA, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF H-2B WORKERS (2010), at 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/16102_LABR%20H2BReport_LR.pdf
(accessed January 27, 2016). But see RON HIRA, ECON. POLICY INST., THE H-1B AND L-1 VISA 
PROGRAMS: OUT OF CONTROL, EPI BRIEFING PAPER #280 (Oct. 14, 2010) at 
http://www.epi.org/publication/bp280/; DANIEL COSTA, ECON. POLICY INST., THE H-2B TEMPORARY 
FOREIGN WORKER PROGRAM: FOR LABOR SHORTAGES OR CHEAP, TEMPORARY LABOR?, EPI BRIEFING 
PAPER #416, (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.epi.org/publication/h2b-temporary-foreign-worker-program-
for-labor-shortages-or-cheap-temporary-labor/ (accessed January 27, 2016).
23. Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor 
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C. Litigating Migrant Protections
.  See Union Accused of Betraying Migrant Carnival Workers
See A Progressive Champion in Maryland Sides with Seafood Companies
over Visa Regulations
See Indian Guest Workers Awarded $14 Million
See Lawsuits Claim Disney Colluded to Replace U.S. Workers with Immigrants
See, e.g Diplomat From India Is Indicted Again over Housekeeper
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A 2011 front-page story in the New York Times about J-1 visa holders 
working long hours in abusive conditions packaging products for Hershey 
Chocolate Corp exposed the program as a cheap labor scheme, not the cul-
tural exchange experience for young foreigners it was meant to be.31 The 
State Department reformed the program, but the Government Accountabil-
ity Office found in 2015 that the program continues to lack the safeguards 
necessary to ensure that participants are offered cultural activities and not 
charged exorbitant fees.32
In February 2016, a class action suit on behalf of foreign au pair em-
ployees holding J-1 visas went forward to trial.33 Plaintiffs argued that fif-
teen J-1 visa sponsoring companies colluded to suppress wages in violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage 
and hour laws. The court also held that the au pairs can maintain claims for 
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and promissory estop-
pel.34
Employers of H-1B visa holders are now concerned about a legislative 
proposal that would make it easier for American workers to file lawsuits 
against companies who hire foreign employees. They say, “The goal ap-
pears to be to produce enough legal peril for employers that they will avoid 
hiring high-skilled foreign nationals in the United States.”35 They further 
argue that such measure would “have the effect of. . .encouraging many 
companies to expand resources abroad and place more people in other 
countries.”36
‘Like a Dog’ in Wealthy Minnesota Suburb, Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 18, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/18/chinese-nanny-beaten-starved-
treated-like-a-dog-in-wealthy-minn-suburb-authorities-say/.
31. See Julia Preston, Foreign Students in Work Visa Program Stage Walkout at Plant, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/us/18immig.html; Julia Preston, State
Department Revises Foreign Student Job Program after Abuse Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/us/politics/us-revises-foreign-student-job-program.html.
32. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-265, SUMMER WORK TRAVEL PROGRAM:
STATE DEPARTMENT HAS TAKEN STEPS TO STRENGTHEN PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, BUT ADDITIONAL 
ACTIONS COULD FURTHER ENHANCE OVERSIGHT, at 24–26 (2015), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668453.pdf.
33. See Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-03074-CMA-KMT, 2015 WL 7253286, at 
*5–6, *43 (D. Colo. Feb. 22, 2016).
34. Id. See also Laura D. Francis, J-1 Au Pairs Maintain Claims Sponsors Colluded to Fix Wag-
es, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) Feb. 23, 2016 at A-2.
35. See NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, THE REAL WORLD IMPACT OF PROPOSED HIGH-
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D. International Standards and American Exceptionalism
Both sides in the labor-shortage vs. labor-exploitation debate make 
compelling arguments. Ultimately, the arguments depend on underlying 
political inclinations and angle of approach. Labor advocates criticize what 
they see as the misuse of immigration programs. But this doesn’t mean (nor 
do they argue) that immigration should be halted. It means that the United 
States a new immigration policy that balances the needs of companies and 
the overall economy with needs for high labor standards and protection of 
workers’ rights. This is where international human rights norms concerning 
migrant labor can inform analysis and discourse.
In its 2006 Multilateral Framework, the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO) recognized the reality that member states are not willing to cede 
sovereignty on basic immigration policy, while recommending that they 
take international standards into consideration:
States have the sovereign right to develop their own policies to manage 
labor migration. International labor standards and other international in-
struments, as well as guidelines, as appropriate, should play an important 
role to make these policies coherent, effective and fair.37
But we in the United States have yet to seriously engage international 
labor standards in developing migrant labor policies. For example, a 2013 
critical analysis of U.S. immigration by a coalition of unions and immigrant 
worker advocacy groups concludes that regardless of visa category, immi-
grant workers in the United States face “disturbingly common” patterns of 
abuse including “fraud, discrimination, coercion, retaliation, blacklisting 
and, in some cases, forced labor, indentured servitude, debt bondage and 
human trafficking.”38 However, this impressive 50-page report, backed up 
by more than 300 source citations, offering eight “core principles” and 
detailed policy recommendations, does not discuss the United Nations’
International Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Work-
ers and Members of Their Families and mentions only in passing related 
ILO conventions.
This is not surprising, nor is it a cause for criticism. It simply reflects 
the reality that international law and international labor and human rights 
standards have limited purchase in American policy discourse, even among 
advocates whose newly-proposed core principles have long been contained 
in these international instruments. With the world’s longest-standing con-
37. Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, supra note 4, at 11.
38. INT’L LAB. RECRUITMENT WORKING GRP., THE AMERICAN DREAM UP FOR SALE: A
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stitution, our Bill of Rights, and a rich rule-of-law tradition, Americans 
tend to think we don’t need the rest of the world to tell us how to order our 
affairs.39 Practically alone in the world, for example, the United States has 
refused to ratify the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)40 and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC).41
The “American exceptionalism” strain in our law and policy mix is 
especially marked in the labor-related field. Outside a small cadre of com-
parative and international specialists, most actors in the U.S. labor law 
system have little familiarity with ILO conventions and labor provisions in 
other international instruments. As one scholar noted:
The official American view is that international human rights are endan-
gered elsewhere, and that American labor law is a model for the rest of 
the world. The rest of the world may not be convinced that American la-
bor law, old and flawed as it is, is a model for the modern world. But 
more to the present point, American legal institutions and decision mak-
ers have thus far been deaf to the claim that international labor law pro-
vides a potential model for American labor law, or even a critical 
vantage point from which to view American labor law (footnote omit-
ted).42
The United States has ratified just 14 of the ILO’s 189 conventions, 
and among the 14 are just two of the organization’s eight “core conven-
tions” on forced labor and child labor.43 It has not ratified either of the 
ILO’s migrant labor conventions, nor the UN migrant convention.44
39. See Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Feder-
alism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, at 1567–75 (2006).
40. United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 20378.
41. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 27531. 
42. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1589 (2002).
43. See ILO Conventions: Ratifications for United States, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102871 
(last visited September 8, 2016) (The United States has ratified Convention No. 105 on forced labor and 
Convention No. 182 on worst forms of child labor. The United States has not ratified Convention No. 
29 on forced labor, No. 87 on freedom of association, No. 98 on the right to organize, No. 100 on equal 
pay, No. 111 on nondiscrimination, and No. 138 on child labor.).
44. See Ratifications of C097 - Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97),
INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT
_ID:312242:NO (last visited September 8, 2016); Ratifications of C143 - Migrant Workers (Supplemen-
tary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT
_ID:312288:NO (last visited September 8, 2016); on ratification of the Migrant Workers convention, 
see United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
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In the face of American exceptionalism, are we in the United States 
ready to examine and learn from international standards and international 
discourse on migrant workers’ rights? Here is how Maria Lorena Cook 
characterizes the problem:
There are political, legal, and discursive limits on the use of human 
rights frames, particularly in the United States. Moreover, much of the 
contemporary debate on immigration in the US and other advanced in-
dustrial democracies revolves around arguments about security, econom-
ics, and law—arguments that are rooted in the nation-state. This gives 
rise to the advocate’s dilemma: on the one hand, universal norms such as 
human rights, which are theoretically well suited to advancing immi-
grants’ claims, may have little resonance within national settings; on the 
other hand, the debates around which immigration arguments typically 
turn, and the terrain on which advocates must fight, derive their values 
and assumptions from a nation-state framework that is self-limiting.45
III. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE
A. International Norms
A brief summary of the three major international instruments on mi-
grant labor standards introduces this section and the discussion that fol-
lows.
ILO Convention No. 97 on migration for employment dates to 1949 
and aims mainly at fraudulent recruiting and misleading information about 
migrant work opportunities. It calls for governments to themselves admin-
ister migrant labor recruiting services, or to carefully regulate such services 
by private actors.46
Adopted in 1975, Convention No. 143 on migration “in abusive condi-
tions” aims at traffickers and their victims. It calls on countries to “suppress 
clandestine movements of migrants for employment and illegal employ-
ment” of migrants and to criminally prosecute traffickers.47 It goes on to 
promote equality of opportunity and treatment for migrant workers.48
The UN adopted its migrant worker convention in 1990, but it took 
more than a decade for it to enter into force.49 The terms of the convention 
45. Maria Lorena Cook, The Advocate’s Dilemma: Framing Migrant Rights in National Settings,
4 STUDIES IN SOCIAL JUSTICE 145, 146 (2010).
46. See ILO No. 97, supra note 2 at annex I–II.
47. ILO No. 143, supra note 3 at art. 3.
48. Id. art. 8–10.
49. For an overview of adoption, entry into force, and ratification of the Migrant Workers Con-
vention, see International Migration Convention,, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG.
[UNESCO], http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-
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required at least twenty ratifications before going into force, so that a first 
mover is not alone assuming obligations. Mostly migrant-sending countries 
made up the first twenty ratifiers, a threshold achieved in 2003. This pat-
tern has held in years since, when another twenty countries ratified the 
convention, most of them likewise primarily sending countries.50
Among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) member states, only Chile, Mexico and Turkey have ratified the 
migrant labor convention. The total of forty is still far below the UN’s
nearly 200-country membership, compared with CEDAW and the CRC, 
which have almost universal ratification (but not by the United States). 
Ratification of the ILO migrant labor conventions is also characterized by 
mostly sending-country approval: 49 countries have ratified Convention 
No. 97, and 23 have ratified convention 143 (again, not including the Unit-
ed States).51
Notwithstanding relatively low ratification levels, these instruments 
reflect common international expectations as to how migrant workers 
should be treated. The UN migrant worker convention and the two ILO 
migrant labor conventions are long, dense, complex documents. This article 
is not going to delve into their fine details. Rather, it synthesizes central 
precepts and lay them alongside U.S. law, policy, and on-the-ground reality 
to examine how treatment of migrant workers in the United States com-
ports with global standards.
The international instruments on rights and protections of migrant 
workers share these principles:
Non-discrimination (i.e. on traditional grounds such as race, 
sex, national origin, religion etc., separate from migration sta-
tus);52
Humane treatment that respects the essential dignity of the 
person;53
50. Id.
51. See Ratifications of C097 - Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97),
INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT
_ID:312242:NO (last visited September 8, 2016); Ratifications of C143 - Migrant Workers (Supplemen-
tary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), INT’L LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT
_ID:312288:NO (last visited September 8, 2016).
52. See United Nations Migrant Worker Convention art. 7, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 39481 
[hereinafter Migrant Worker Convention]; ILO No. 97, supra note 2 art. 6; ILO No. 143, supra note 3
art. 10.
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Document integrity ensuring that migrants maintain posses-
sion of or have immediate, unfettered access to their pass-
ports, work permits, visas, birth certificates or any other vital 
personal document;54
Regulated recruitment systems ensuring that workers are ap-
prised of terms and conditions of employment under tempo-
rary work visas and that promised terms and conditions 
become a reality, without workers having to pay excessive 
fees, transportation costs, or bribes to get their visas and their 
jobs;55
Wages, conditions, and other terms of employment “not less 
favorable” than those of co-workers who are “nationals”;56
Freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right to 
bargain collectively;57
Access to justice and remedy for injustice—migrant workers 
should have legal recourse available to them for violations of 
minimum labor standards under national law, violations of 
contracted conditions of employment, or violations of terms 
guaranteed by their work visas.58
B. U.S. Law and Practice
Addressing each of these in turn, the following examples of ways in 
which conditions for immigrant workers in the United States fail to live up 
to international norms suggest that reform efforts might benefit from taking 
into account and responding to these baseline standards.
1. Discrimination
Many immigrant workers face discrimination because of sex, race, na-
tional origin, religion and other grounds. For starters, foreign recruiters can 
openly discriminate against workers seeking temporary visas for employ-
ment in the United States, based on the principle of non-extraterritorial
application of U.S. anti-discrimination statutes.59
54. See Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 52 art. 21.
55. See Id. art. 66; ILO No. 97, supra note 2 at annex I-II.
56. See Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 52 art. 27.
57. See Id. art. 7; ILO No. 97, supra note 2 at art. 6; ILO No. 143, supra note 3 at art. 10.
58. See Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 52 art. 83.
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Once here, many immigrant workers endure discrimination both bla-
tant and disguised.60 They and members of their families suffer economic, 
social and health effects of discrimination in many areas.61 Sexual harass-
ment is an especially widespread abuse.62 But discrimination can be sub-
tler, too, as when resort operators employ young white East European and 
Russian (mostly women) workers holding H-2 visas for “front-of-the-
house” contact with customers, while Mexican and Central Americans with 
the same visas work in “back-of-the house” cooking and cleaning. In one 
notable example, Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort hotel in Florida 
spurned citizen job applicants in favor of H-2B visa holders from Eastern 
Europe.63
2. Humane treatment
Conditions for immigrant workers such as the welders from India in 
the Signal International litigation and many household domestic employees 
in anti-slavery prosecutions clearly run afoul of humane treatment require-
ments. One shocking example of non-conformance with the humane treat-
ment standard is found in accounts of immigrant women in detention being 
shackled to hospital beds while giving birth.64 Beyond that, Amnesty Inter-
national has documented pervasive problems with conditions of detention, 
such as comingling of immigration detainees with individuals convicted of 
criminal offenses; inappropriate and excessive use of restraints; inadequate 
access to healthcare, including mental health services; inadequate access to 
60. See Griffith, supra note 23, at 126, 129, 134, 150-51, 161.
61. See Cecilia Ayón, Economic, Social, and Health Effects of Discrimination on Latino Immi-
grant Families, MIGRATION POL’Y. INST. (September 2015), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/economic-social-and-health-effects-discrimination-latino-
immigrant-families (accessed February 19, 2016).
62. See, e.g., Irma Morales Waugh, Examining the Sexual Harassment Experiences of Mexican 
Immigrant Farmworking Women, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 237, at 245–54 (2010); Grace Meng, 
Cultivating Fear: The Vulnerability of Immigrant Farmworkers in the US to Sexual Violence and 
Sexual Harassment, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 15 2012), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/15/cultivating-fear/vulnerability-immigrant-farmworkers-us-
sexual-violence-and-sexual; Sara Kominers, Working in Fear: Sexual Violence against Women Farm-
workers in the United States: A Literature Review, OXFAM AM. (Apr. 16 2015), 
https://www.northeastern.edu/law/pdfs/academics/phrge/kominers-report.pdf.
63. See Charles V. Bagli & Meghan Twohey, Foreign Labor Fills Vacancies at Trump Club, N.
Y. TIMES (February 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/us/politics/donald-trump-taps-
foreign-work-force-for-his-florida-club.html.
64. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Settlement for a Shackled Pregnant Woman, N. Y. TIMES (October 17, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/us/settlement-for-a-shackled-pregnant-woman.html; Laura 
Mills, Poor Housing, Wage Cheats still Plague Midwest Migrant Farm Workers, IOWAWATCH (De-
cember 30, 2013), http://investigatemidwest.org/2013/12/30/poor-housing-wage-cheats-still-plague-
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exercise; and denial of telephone access and other means of communication 
with family members or advocates.65
Other detention abuses include denial of family visitation, denial of 
physical recreation, denial of telephone access, denial of access to legal 
material and presentations by attorneys, denial of correspondence and other 
mail, improper storage (and resulting loss) of funds and personal property, 
abusive conditions in transfer from one facility to another, denial of toilet 
facilities in hold rooms, and other egregious cases of inhumane treatment.66
And remember, these are not criminal detainees.
3. Document integrity
Document integrity is a recurring problem for immigrant workers in 
the United States. Crew leaders and employers often seize passports, birth 
certificates and visas from H-2A and H-2B workers.67 Diplomats, officials 
of international organizations, international businessmen and other wealthy 
employers of household domestic workers do likewise with workers hold-
ing with B-1, G-5 and A-3 “personal servant” visas.68
Document confiscation puts employees in effective captivity. They are 
already isolated in temporary employee housing quarters, usually with no 
means of independent transportation. But without personal documents they 
fear even to flee an abusive employer.69
4. Regulated recruitment systems
Recruitment abuses are common in U.S. temporary work visa pro-
grams. A 2015 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office found evi-
dence of “third-party recruiters charging workers prohibited fees; not 
65. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA,
7 (March 25, 2009) at http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/usa-jailed-without-
justice?page=show (accessed January 31, 2016).
66. See KAREN TUMLIN ET. AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS REVEAL FAILURES 
IN U.S. IMMIGRANT DETENTION CENTERS 73 (2009), http://www.nilc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/A-Broken-System-2009-07.pdf (accessed February 19, 2016).
67. See ETAN NEWMAN, NO WAY TO TREAT A GUEST: WHY THE H-2A AGRICULTURAL VISA 
PROGRAM FAILS U.S. AND FOREIGN WORKERS 33 (2011), 
https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/documents/7.2.a.6%20No%20Way%20To%20Tre
at%20A%20Guest%20H-2A%20Report.pdf (accessed January 31, 2016); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-154, H-2A AND H-2B VISA PROGRAMS: INCREASED PROTECTIONS 
NEEDED FOR FOREIGN WORKERS, at 31, 36, 72 (2015).
68. See CAROL PIER, HIDDEN IN THE HOME: ABUSE OF DOMESTIC WORKERS WITH SPECIAL 
VISAS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (June 2001), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/usadom), (accessed 
January 31, 2016).
69. See Petula Dvorak, Woman escapes modern-day slavery in a home near the nation’s capital,
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providing information about a job, when required, such as wage level; or 
providing false information about job conditions.”70
Many workers take on high levels of debt to secure visas. For exam-
ple, Filipino teachers recruited to work in Louisiana with H-1B visas were 
charged $15,000 in recruitment fees and had to sign contracts forking over 
10 percent of their salaries to the recruiting agency.71 Nurses recruited to 
work under H-1C “nursing shortage” visas often must sign contracts with 
“breakage fees” in the tens of thousands of dollars if they leave before the 
full contract period ends.72 In many cases, they are hired and placed by 
staffing agencies that contract their labor to hospitals at salaries far below 
that of non-immigrant nurses.73
A prominent U.S. recruiter was found to have manipulated the H-2B 
visa program by bringing in thousands more workers than clients properly 
sought.74 Then he offered the surplus labor force to other employers (grow-
ers, landscapers, ski resort owners and more) and coached them on how to 
discourage American workers from accepting job offers, thus circumvent-
ing the requirement to show a U.S. employee shortage. The recruiter in-
structed employers to hire a handful of token U.S. workers to game the 
system. Then, they treated immigrant workers in vulnerable, abusive condi-
tions as a surplus labor force that employers traded among themselves on 
an as-needed basis. But the immigrant employees were always tied to the 
H-2B visa and powerless to protest conditions or freely to seek other em-
ployment.75
5. Equal treatment at work
The international norm requires equal (i.e. “not less favorable”) treat-
ment of migrant workers.76 But less favorable wages and working condi-
tions for immigrant workers, compared with non-immigrants, permeate the 
70. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 67 at [CITE].
71. See JENNIFER DORNING ET AL., AFL-CIO DEPT. PROF’L. EMP.,GAMING THE SYSTEM: GUEST 
WORKER VISA PROGRAMS AND PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES, at
49 (2012), http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/Gaming-the-System-2012-Revised.pdf; CENTRO DE 
LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE RECRUITMENT REVEALED: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN THE H-2
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM 49 (2013), http://www.cdmigrante.org/recruitment-revealed-
fundamental-flaws-in-the-h-2-temporary-worker-program-and-recommendations-for-change/.
72. See PATRICIA PITTMAN ET. AL., U.S.-BASED INTERNATIONAL NURSE RECRUITMENT:
STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF A BURGEONING INDUSTRY 22 (2007), 
https://www.macfound.org/media/article_pdfs/NURSING_CODE_RESEARCHREPORTYR1.PDF.
73. Id.
74. See Ken Bensinger et al., The Coyote, BUZZFEED NEWS, December 29, 2015, 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/kenbensinger/the-coyote#.xa6OdoEBV.
75. Id.
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standards. Meatpackers’ wages remained substantially higher than the av-
erage manufacturing sector wage into the early 1980s. But then, they re-
versed course and entered into a long decline.82
Meatpacking workers’ wages and conditions declined in tandem with 
the industry’s move away from urban factory settings to the countryside, 
accompanied by stepped-up recruiting of immigrant workers and treating 
them contrary to the “not less favorable” international standard.83 Unlike 
workers in many U.S. manufacturing sectors, most meat and poultry work-
ers do not face employers’ threats to move their plants to other countries 
where wages and workers are suppressed.84 Large quantities of meat are 
heavy and bulky to ship long distances by air or sea, and the perishable 
nature of these products usually requires that high volume, mass-market 
production take place within quick reach of retail outlets.
But this did not block a “Third World” strategy by the U.S. meat and 
poultry industry. Instead of exporting production to developing countries 
for low labor costs, lax health, safety and environmental enforcement, and 
vulnerable, exploited workers, U.S. meat and poultry companies essentially 
are reproducing developing country employment conditions with immi-
grant workers here.85
Downward pressure on wages and conditions is not limited to low-
wage sectors. One exposé notes:
Under federal rules, employers like TCS, Infosys and Wipro that have 
large numbers of H-1B workers in the United States are required to de-
clare that they will not displace American workers. But the companies 
are exempt from that requirement if the H-1B workers are paid at least 
$60,000 a year. H-1B workers at outsourcing firms often receive wages 
at or slightly above $60,000, below what skilled American technology 
82. For an overall historical review and discussion, see generally essays in SHELTON 
STROMQUIST AND MARVIN BERGMAN, UNIONIZING THE JUNGLES: LABOR AND COMMUNITY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY MEATPACKING INDUSTRY (University of Iowa Press 1997).
83. See DONALD D. STULL, ON THE CUTTING EDGE: CHANGES IN MIDWESTERN MEATPACKING 
COMMUNITIES 13 (1st ed. 1997); Michael J. Broadway, From City to Countryside: Recent Changes in 
the Structure and Location of the Meat- and Fish-Processing Industries, in ANY WAY YOU CUT IT:
MEAT PROCESSING AND SMALL-TOWN AMERICA 17, 37 (Donald D. Stull, Michael J. Broadway & 
David Griffith eds., 1995); Alexander Stuart, Meatpackers in Stampede, FORTUNE, June 29, 1981, at 67.
84. See Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, We’ll Close! Plant Closings, Plant-closing Threats, Union 
Organizing and NAFTA, 18 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, no. 3, 1997, at 8,
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cbpubs/17/. 
85. See, e.g, OXFAM AMERICA, LIVES ON THE LINE: THE HUMAN COST OF CHEAP CHICKEN 7–8
(2015), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/Lives_on_the_Line_Full_Report_Final.pdf; 
TED GENOWAYS, THE CHAIN: FARM FACTORY & THE FATE OF OUR FOOD 34 (2014); Ted Genoways, 
The Spam Factory’s Dirty Secret: First, Hormel Gutted the Union. Then it Sped Up the Line. And When 
the Pig-Brain Machine Made Workers Sick, they Got Canned, MOTHER JONES, July 2011, 
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professionals tend to earn, so those firms can offer services to American 
companies at a lower cost, undercutting American workers.86
6. Freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right to bar-
gain collectively
With an important exception, immigrant workers—even undocument-
ed—are covered by most labor and employments laws to the same extent as 
American workers,87 including coverage under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (“NLRA”).88 It should be noted, though, that the exclusion of 
agricultural employees from coverage of the NLRA has a disproportionate 
effect on immigrant workers, who comprise an estimated three-fourths of 
the farm labor force.89 This means that, except in a handful of states with 
agricultural labor relations acts (notably California), farm workers can suf-
fer discrimination for union activity without recourse—a clear violation of 
international standards.
It should be unremarkable that immigrants lawfully working thanks to 
visas, green cards or other work permits are covered by the NLRA. But 
coverage also extends to undocumented immigrant workers. They have the 
same rights as documented immigrants and U.S. workers to join unions, 
vote in NLRB elections, and benefit from collective bargaining agree-
ments.90 This is as it should be: if they were not, employers’ “divide and 
conquer” policies would undermine organizing and collective bargaining 
rights of all workers.
The significant legal exception arises in connection with remedies. In 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the Supreme Court held five-to-four that an 
undocumented worker, because of his immigration status, was not entitled 
to back pay for lost wages after he was illegally fired for union organiz-
ing.91 The five-justice majority said that enforcing immigration law takes 
86. See Haeyoun Park, How Outsourcing Companies Are Gaming the Visa System, N.Y. TIMES,
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/06/us/outsourcing-companies-dominate-
h1b-visas.html.
87. See Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).
88. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 890 (1984); NLRB v. Kolkka, 170 F.3d 937, 941 
(9th Cir. 1999); Concrete Form Walls, Inc., 346 N.L.R.B. 831, 833 (2006); Agri-Processor Co., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 3–4 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
89. See Michael H. LeRoy & Wallace Hendricks, Should “Agricultural Laborers” Continue to be 
Excluded from the National Labor Relations Act?, 48 EMORY L.J. 489, 500 (1997); U.S. DEP’T. OF
LABOR, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY (UNDATED), DATA TABLES, “NATIONAL 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS,” table 1, at https://www.doleta.gov/agworker/naws.cfm (SEE EXCEL 
FILE “HIRED CROP WORKER DEMOGRAPHICS, NATIONAL ESTIMATES, FIVE TIME PERIODS”).
90. See Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 890; Kolkka, 170 F.3d at 941; Concrete Form Walls, Inc., 346
N.L.R.B. at 833 (Apr. 13, 2006); Agri-Processor Co., Inc., 514 F.3d at 3–4.
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precedence over enforcing labor law. A powerful dissent argued that there 
was not such a conflict and that a “backpay order will not interfere with the 
implementation of immigration policy. Rather, it reasonably helps to deter 
unlawful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to pre-
vent.”92 The dissenters went on to say:
Without the possibility of the deterrence that backpay provides, the 
Board can impose only future-oriented obligations upon law-violating 
employers—for it has no other weapons in its remedial arsenal. And in 
the absence of the backpay weapon, employers could conclude that they 
can violate the labor laws at least once with impunity. Hence the back-
pay remedy is necessary; it helps make labor law enforcement credible; 
it makes clear that violating the labor laws will not pay . . . To deny the 
Board the power to award backpay. . .lowers the cost to the employer of 
an initial labor law violation (provided, of course, that the only victims 
are illegal aliens). It thereby increases the employer’s incentive to find 
and to hire illegal-alien employees. Were the Board forbidden to assess 
backpay against a knowing employer—a circumstance not before us to-
day—this perverse economic incentive, which runs directly contrary to 
the immigration statute’s basic objective, would be obvious and seri-
ous.93
The “obvious and serious” shoe dropped in Mezonos Maven Bakery,
when the NLRB ruled that Hoffman further required a denial of backpay to 
workers fired for union activity even where their undocumented status was 
known to the employer at the time of hiring.94 Two Board members felt 
bound by Hoffman, but noted that “in addition to the obvious failure to 
make employee-victims whole—the Act’s enforcement is undermined, 
employees are chilled in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, the work-
force is fragmented, and a vital check on workplace abuses is removed.”95
As a result, unscrupulous employers can hire undocumented workers and 
discriminate against them for exercising the right to freedom of association 
with total impunity.
The Hoffman decision sparked immediate worry that undocumented 
workers might be denied all forms of backpay for any labor or employment 
law violation.96 It appears that backpay awards for work actually performed 
(as with minimum wage or overtime pay violations) remain available to 
undocumented workers. But other forms of compensation—such as work-
ers’ compensation or damage awards for sexual harassment and other dis-
92. Id. at 153.
93. Id. at 154–57.
94. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc. 357 N.L.R.B. 377, 377 (2011).
95. Id. at 380.
96. See Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
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crimination abuses, anti-retaliation remedies, and others—are subject to a 
patchwork of court decisions in different jurisdictions, some favorable and 
some unfavorable to immigrant workers.97
The American labor movement tested the Hoffman decision in an in-
ternational forum. In November 2003, the International Labour Organiza-
tion Committee on Freedom of Association declared that the Hoffman
doctrine violates international legal obligations to protect workers’ organiz-
ing rights. The Committee concluded that “the remedial measures left to 
the NLRB in cases of illegal dismissals of undocumented workers are inad-
equate to ensure effective protection against acts of anti-union discrimina-
tion.”98
The ILO Committee recommended congressional action to bring U.S. 
law “into conformity with freedom of association principles, in full consul-
tation with the social partners concerned, with the aim of ensuring effective 
protection for all workers against acts of anti-union discrimination in the 
wake of the Hoffman decision.”99 Of course, the ILO has no enforcement 
authority and the United States has no legal obligation to implement ILO 
recommendations.
Besides the ILO, another international human rights tribunal took up 
the Hoffman issue. Joined by immigrant worker advocates in the United 
States, Mexico petitioned the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for an 
advisory opinion on U.S. treatment of immigrant workers.100
In its opinion, the Inter-American Court said that undocumented 
workers are entitled to the same labor rights, including wages owed, protec-
tion from discrimination, protection for health and safety on the job, and 
back pay, as are citizens and those working lawfully in a country. The 
Court said that despite their irregular status “[I]f undocumented migrants 
are engaged, they immediately become possessors of the labor rights corre-
sponding to workers . . . This is very important, because one of the princi-
pal problems that occurs in the context of immigration is that migrant 
workers who lack permission to work are engaged in unfavorable condi-
tions compared to other workers.”101
97. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM.
U. L. REV. 1361, 1370 (2009).
98. See Int’l Labour Org. Comm. On Freedom of Ass’n, Rep. in which the Com. Requests to be 
Kept Informed on Dev., ¶ 610 Rep. No. 332 (2003).
99. Id. at ¶ 613.
100. See Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrant Workers, Advisory Opinion 
OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 1 (September 17, 2003).
101. Id. at ¶ 136. For a summary discussion, see NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, FACTS 
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7. Recourse and remedy
Under principles common to the UN migrant worker convention and 
the two ILO instruments, workers should be able to turn to labor and em-
ployment law enforcement agencies and to the judicial system for viola-
tions of their rights and protections under national law.102 As a threshold 
problem, most immigrant workers holding visas are ineligible for federal or 
state-funded legal services for help with workplace violations.103 They are 
on their own to find a lawyer for assistance, and are likely to be turned 
down unless a large class of employees can be created to pursue large-scale 
financial remedies. The potential recovery for any single worker makes 
taking a case financially unfeasible for most practicing attorneys, and indi-
vidual employees cannot afford the attorney’s going rate.
Undocumented workers with potential claims face the same barriers 
and more. Not making legal recourse and remedy available to immigrants 
invites the emergence of an underclass of exploited and frightened workers, 
putting enormous downward pressure on labor standards generally.
Keeping millions of undocumented workers “in the shadows” has ex-
actly this effect. They might be covered by labor and employment laws, but 
coverage by itself is useless if workers are afraid to even voice concerns 
about working conditions or to file complaints with government agencies 
because they are afraid that employers’ challenges to their immigration 
status will expose them to deportation.104
The “fear factor” is not limited to undocumented workers. Employees 
with visas that tie them to a particular employer are also afraid to protest 
conditions or assert their rights. The employer-specificity of temporary 
work visas are the main reason that employment under such visas is often 
described as a form of indentured servitude.105 Employers can create a pre-
text to summarily fire visa-holding workers who protest conditions, which 
RIGHTS HEARING (Mar. 3, 2005), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/facts-about-the-
hoffman-case-and-international-law.pdf.
102. See Migrant Worker Convention, supra note 52 art. 83.
103. See 45 C.F.R. § 1626.1 (2016); for discussion, see generally ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CIVIL 
LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES AN UPDATE FOR 2013 6 (2013), http://www.clasp.org/resources-
and-publications/publication-1/CIVIL-LEGAL-AID-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES-3.pdf; LEGAL 
SERVICES CORPORATION, ABOUT STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LSC-FUNDED PROGRAMS, (noting 
“with limited exceptions such as lawful permanent residents, H2A agricultural workers, H2B forestry 
workers, and victims of battering, extreme cruelty, sexual assault or trafficking”),
http://www.lsc.gov/about-statutory-restrictions-lsc-funded-programs (last visited Sep. 26, 2016).
104. For discussion, see Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker 
and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961 (2006).
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puts them immediately “out of status” and subject to deportation.106 The 
result is that many suffer in silence, with no place else to go.107 Workers
who manage to bring wage and hour complaints often have to return home 
before their cases are decided, creating a huge communication and logistics 
problem for advocates handling their cases in U.S. proceedings.108
IV. MIGRANT LABOR AND TRADE AGREEMENTS
A. NAFTA and Migrant Workers
Another international angle of approach to migrant labor law and poli-
cy arises in trade agreements negotiated by the United States with commer-
cial partners and related labor provisions in such agreements. The chief 
example is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its 
supplemental North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC).
Negotiated in the early 1990s, NAFTA created a new visa category 
called the TN visa for business and professional employees entering the 
United States for temporary work.109 However, NAFTA stopped there. 
Rebuffing Mexico’s request, the United States ruled out any farther-
reaching immigration provisions in NAFTA (just as Mexico refused to 
negotiate over its energy reserves and Canada refused to negotiate over its 
protected cultural sector; for each of the three countries, its jealously 
guarded issue was “off-the-table” in NAFTA negotiations).110
To obtain a TN visa, an applicant has to hold a university degree and 
demonstrate “business activity at a professional level” in one of sixty busi-
ness, medical, scientific and educational professions listed in a NAFTA 
106. Id. at 1.
107. Id.at 16. Note some research suggests that the “indenture” case might be overstated for skilled 
H-1B high-tech employees who manage to move from firm-to-firm, especially when overall unem-
ployment is low. See Briggs Depew et al., Inter-firm Mobility and Return Migration Patterns of Skilled 
Guest Workers, J. POPUL ECON. 1 (August 2016), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00148-016-
0607-y/fulltext.html?view=classic.
108. See NAN SCHIVONE, GLOBAL WORKERS JUSTICE ALLIANCE, CHALLENGES IN 
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: REPRESENTING ABSENTEE MIGRANT WORKERS IN U.S. COURTS (4th Ed. 
2014) at 
http://www.globalworkers.org/sites/default/files/4th%20Ed_Challenges%20in%20Transnational%20Lit
igation_2014%28WEB%29_0.pdf (table of contents accessed February 9, 2016; full text available as 
hard copy upon request to Global Workers Justice Alliance). 
109. See NAFTA, supra note 5, at 664–67; TN Visa — North American Free Trade Agreement for 
Canadian and Mexican Citizens, UNIV. OF MICH. INT’L CTR.,
http://internationalcenter.umich.edu/immig/tnvisa/.
110. See MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA: HOW THE DEAL
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annex, starting with A for accountant and ending with Z for zoologist.111
The TN visa program has been relatively uncontroversial, compared with 
the H-1B and L visa programs for professionals and highly-skilled employ-
ees and recurring exposés about their misuse by employers.112 The TN 
program is sufficiently narrow, and the volume of trade among the three 
NAFTA countries is sufficiently large, that TN visa holders mostly fly 
under the radar of immigrations concerns. They mostly come for short 
stays, not for long-term employment in the United States.113
B. The NAALC, Labor Principle 11, and Complaints and Cases
NAFTA went no farther on immigration, but the three countries took 
up migrant labor concerns in the supplemental North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), one of two “side agreements” negotiated 
in 1993 after Bill Clinton took office.114
The NAALC defined eleven “labor principles” that the United States, 
Mexico and Canada parties pledged to promote. In Labor Principle 11 on 
protection of migrant workers, they agreed to promote the principle of 
“[p]roviding migrant workers in a Party’s territory with the same legal 
protection as the Party’s nationals in respect of working conditions.”115
Trade unions, human rights groups, and other labor advocates in North 
America have made extensive use of the NAALC’s complaint mechanism 
to target exploitative treatment of Mexican migrant workers in the United 
States. In examining these cases, one must keep in mind that the NAALC 
did not create an adjudicatory system. It is rather a “soft law” procedure 
making use of reviews, investigations, research, public hearings, reports, 
recommendations, consultations, action plans, and the like. Still, advocates’
creative use of the mechanism can bring concrete positive results.116
111. 8 C.F.R. § 214.6 (2016).
112. See, e.g., Jacob T. Muklewicz, The TN visa category: An oasis in the Desert of Dried up 
International talent pools, INSIDE COUNSEL, May 15, 2015, 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/05/15/the-tn-visa-category-an-oasis-in-the-desert-of-dri.
113. See Elizabeth M. Grieco, Length of Visit of Nonimmigrants Departing the United States in 
2003 6, tbl. 6, (Dep’t of Homeland Security, Off. of Immigr. Stat. Working Paper, Mar. 2005), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/LengthVstNonim2003.pdf (87 percent of TN 
visa holders stayed less than one year).
114. See NAALC, supra note 7, art. 52. Another side agreement took shape in the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993); for 
a discussion of the side agreements, see Cameron and Tomlin, supra note 110.
115. NAALC, supra note 7 annex I, princ. 11,
116. National Union of Workers (“UNT”) et al., Mexico NAO Submission 9802 (Apple Growers),
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR - BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS (May 27, 1998), at 
https://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/pdf/mx_9802_apple_growers_submission.pdf. For official 





      03/01/2017   10:44:39
38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 125 Side A      03/01/2017   10:44:39
8 COMPA MACRO EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 1/30/2017 7:49 PM
2017] THE PIPER LECTURE 235
1. Washington State Apple Case
A coalition of Mexican trade unions and farmworker organizations 
filed a wide-ranging NAALC complaint in May 1998 alleging failure of 
U.S. labor law to protect migrant workers’ rights in the Washington State 
apple industry.117 Virtually all of the 50,000 workers who harvest apples 
are immigrants from Mexico and Central America.118
The submission cited the lack of legal protection for farmworker un-
ion organizing, widespread health and safety violations, discrimination 
against immigrant workers, and employers’ use of threats and intimidation 
in recent union representation elections in apple packing and shipping facil-
ities. The complaint called on the Mexican government to invoke review 
and consultation mechanisms under the NAALC.119
A public hearing in Mexico City garnered widespread publicity in the 
news media of both the United States and Mexico; Mexico’s secretary of 
labor formally requested ministerial consultations with the U.S. secretary of 
labor. This development sparked a new round of publicity and related at-
tention to the conditions of immigrant workers in the industry.120
In May 2000, the governments announced a program of events result-
ing from the consultations, including a public forum for workers, unions, 
employers and government officials and an “outreach” effort by labor law 
enforcement personnel.121 On the ground, it led to improvements in hous-
ing conditions, piecework rate calculations, and health and safety enforce-
ment.122
tion (NAALC), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR - BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS at
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalc.htm (filter list by “Mexico”) (last visited Sept. 21, 
2016). See also Tamara Kay, NAFTA and the Politics of Labor Transnationalism (2004) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, U.C., Berkeley).
117. See Steven Greenhouse, Mexicans Were Denied U.S. Rights, Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES May 28, 
1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/28/us/mexicans-were-denied-us-rights-suit-says.html.
118. See Lynda V. Mapes, Needed but Often Illegal, they Pick our Crops, Pine for Home, SEATTLE 
TIMES, June 18, 2000, http://old.seattletimes.com/special/mexico/stories/mex1a.html; Matthew Geyman 
et al., Indigenous Guatemalan and Mexican Workers in Washington State: Living Conditions and Legal 
Issues, 5 MEX. LAW REV. 1 (2012), 
http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-05782012000200002.
119. See UNT et al., supra note 116.
120. See, e.g., Molly Moore, Mexican Farmhands Accuse U.S. Firms: Panel Hears Washington 
Apple Pickers, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1998, at A36.
121. See Alexis M. Herman & Mariano Palacios Alcocer, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR - BUREAU OF 
INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, Ministerial Consultations - Mexico Submissions 9801, 9802 and 9803 (May 18, 
2000), at http://www.naalc.org/english/pdf/pubcomm/minagr_mex1998_01_02_03_en.pdf.
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2. North Carolina H-2A Case
In February 2003, advocates filed a complaint alleging that the United 
States failed to protect the rights of Mexican migrant agricultural workers 
recruited to work in the state of North Carolina through the H-2A visa pro-
gram.123 North Carolina was (and still is) the biggest single state with H-2A 
visa workers, with some 10,000 migrants coming under the program.124
Complainants argued that employers restricted H-2A workers’ access 
to union organizers, service providers, and legal aid attorneys; denied H-2A 
workers medical care and access to compensation for on-the job injuries; 
blacklisted workers from participating in the program if they file com-
plaints about on-the-job injuries or unpaid wages; refused to hire women or 
workers over a certain age; and manipulated the growing season and forced 
workers to sign voluntary resignations in order to avoid paying required 
travel and other expenses.125
Thanks in part to the international spotlight of the NAALC complaint 
process, the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) gained union 
recognition from the North Carolina Growers Association and has success-
fully negotiated a series of contracts.126
3. Carnival Workers H-2B Case
In September 2011, migrant worker advocacy groups filed a complaint 
arguing that the U.S. government had failed to comply with its obligations 
under the NAALC to effectively enforce labor laws with respect to mi-
grants working in the carnival and fair industry under H-2B visas.127 The 
individual migrant workers were originally from the Mexican states of 
Zacatecas and Veracruz and worked for J&J Amusements, Inc. and 
Reithoffer Shows, Inc. in the U.S. from 2007 to 2009.
123. See Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos & Farmworker Justice Fund, 
Inc., Mexico NAO Submission 2003-1 (North Carolina), U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR - BUREAU OF INT’L
LABOR AFFAIRS (Feb. 11, 2003), at https://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/pdf/mx_2003-
01_carolina_submission.pdf [hereinafter Mexico NAO Submission 2003-1].
124. See H-2A Temporary Agricultural Visa Program, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR - OFF. OF FOREIGN 
LABOR CERTIFICATION (2012),
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/h_2a_selected_statistics.pdf; H-2A Workers in the United 
States – Data: Top Ten States of Employment 2012, GLOB. WORKERS JUSTICE ALL.,
http://globalworkers.org/iii-h-2a-workers-us-%E2%80%93-figures (last visited Sept. 21, 2016).
125. Mexico NAO Submission 2003-1, supra note 123. See also Meier, supra note 24.
126. See Organizing the South, FARM LABOR ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (“FLOC”),
http://www.floc.com/wordpress/cross-border-organizing/north-carolina-organizing/ (last visited Sept. 
21, 2016).
127. See Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc. et al., Mexico Submission 2011-1 (H-2B Visa 
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The complainants alleged that 1) the U.S. government allowed carni-
val and fair industry employers of workers with H-2B visas to deny their 
employees minimum wage and overtime payments; 2) the U.S. government 
failed to conduct inspections of traveling carnivals and fairs that employed 
H-2B workers; 3) the U.S. government failed to enforce requirements that 
H-2B workers be reimbursed for pre-employment visa-related and travel 
expenses; 4) the U.S. government failed to prevent employers’ illegally 
withholding a portion of the workers’ pay to ensure they stay for the entire 
period of temporary employment and requiring workers to purchase $100 
uniforms; and finally 5)
H-2B visa workers and other migrant workers have a difficult time ac-
cessing administrative and judicial resources because they work in indus-
tries that require them to work seven days a week and travel from place to 
place.128
In November 2012, Mexico issued a bold critique of U.S. labor laws 
and policies governing migrant workers.129 In April 2014, Secretary of 
Labor Thomas E. Perez and his Mexican counterpart issued a detailed Min-
isterial Declaration to address the issues raised in all the NAALC com-
plaints on migrant workers. Their plan for extensive outreach, education, 
and enforcement is now underway.130
This review of migrant labor complaints under the NAFTA labor 
agreement suggests that the international “not less favorable” norm embod-
ied in a trade agreement can influence policy steps within the United States. 
It did not have the effect of changing immigration law, but it spurred a 
response by the government in several areas that led to improved condi-
tions for migrants.131 As Xóchitl Bada and Shannon Gleeson note:
This new form of immigrant worker advocacy emerged in 2008 through 
the creation of the annual Labor Rights Week (LRW), which is a collab-
orative effort between the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and Mexi-
co’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The LRW is executed through dozens 
of individual regional agreements between local regulatory agencies and 
Mexican consulate offices at the state level. Made possible in large part 
128. Id.
129. See MEXICAN SECRETARIAT OF LABOR AND SOCIAL WELFARE, REPORT ON THE REVIEW BY 
THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF MEXICO OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS MEX 2003-1 AND
MEX 2011-1 PURSUANT TO THE NAALC (UNOFFICIAL DOL TRANSLATION) 75 (2012), 
https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/mx_report_eng.pdf.
130. See U.S. Response to Mexico’s Request for Migrant Worker Outreach, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 
- BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS (April 3, 2014), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/preference-
programs/US-Mexico.htm.
131. For discussion, see Top 10 CDM Victories, CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE (Sept. 
2015), http://www.cdmigrante.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Top-10-CDM-Victories.pdf (#9: Urg-
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by a 2004 federal memorandum of understanding between the Mexican 
Secretary of Foreign of Affairs and the U.S. Secretary of Labor, as well 
as several subsequent accords with other agencies, the annual LRW rep-
resents the institutionalization of a binational partnership that may be 
characterized as what Amengual and Fine (2013) refer to as a “model of 
transnationally coproduced regulatory enforcement of labor stand-
ards.”132
C. Post-NAFTA Migrant Labor Omissions
Unfortunately, in post-NAFTA trade agreements’ labor chapters, the 
United States has moved away from addressing migrant labor concerns. 
Starting with the U.S.-Jordan agreement of 2002 and continuing through 
trade agreements with Central American countries, Peru, Korea, Colombia 
and others, and now in the much-debated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
trade agreement, the United States dropped the NAALC labor principle on 
protection of migrant workers’ rights. Instead, U.S. focus turned to ILO 
core labor standards (on freedom of association, forced labor, child labor 
and discrimination) and what the agreements call “acceptable conditions”
on wages, hours, and health and safety at work.133 These clauses should 
apply equally to migrant workers, but the post-NAFTA accords are silent 
on this point.
Labor migration is a global phenomenon, but the NAALC remains the 
only labor-trade agreement that includes protection for migrant workers. 
TPP negotiators have not said whether NAFTA and the NAALC will sur-
vive and remain in effect alongside the TPP, or whether they will be com-
pletely supplanted by the Trans-Pacific pact.134 If the NAALC survives, it 
132. See Xóchitl Bada & Shannon Gleeson, A New Approach to Migrant Labor Rights Enforce-
ment: The Crisis of Undocumented Worker Abuse and Mexican Consular Advocacy in the United 
States, 40 LAB. STUD. J. 32, 34 (2015), citing Matthew Amengual and Janice Fine, Co-enforcing Labor 
Standards: The Unique Contributions of State and Worker Organizations in Argentina and the United 
States, in REGULATION & GOVERNANCE (June 24, 2106), at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12122/abstract.
133. See, e.g., U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement art. 16, Aug. 5, 
2004, 43 I.L.M. 514,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file320_3936.pdf (noting in 
Article 16.1, “The Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) and their commitments under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work and its Follow-Up (1998) (ILO Declaration)” and Article 16.8, “acceptable conditions of work 
with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health,” and similar lan-
guage in labor chapters of other U.S. trade agreements. Post-NAFTA/NAALC trade agreements are 
silent on rights of immigrant workers. See all at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements.)
134. The U.S. Trade Representative says only it will “upgrade” NAFTA; see TPP: Upgrading the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Upgrading-the-North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement-
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is unclear whether advocates will still be able to invoke its labor principle 
on protection of migrant workers, which in any case would only involve the 
three original NAFTA parties.135
Preserving this feature of the NAALC for only three countries is not 
enough. While it now appears to be a moot point in light of the incoming 
administration’s stated intention to “tear up” the TPP and renegotiate other 
trade agreements such as NAFTA,136 labor advocates should continue to 
insist that the NAALC’s signature feature on protection of migrant work-
ers’ rights be included in any newly-negotiated trade agreements and 
strengthened in any re-drawn agreements.
V. TURNING TO A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH
A. Diffusing Frames
Discussion and advocacy of international standards on migrant work-
ers does not mean to suggest that UN and ILO conventions have all the 
answers and are free of shortcomings. For one thing, they offer most of 
their protections to workers who obtain visas or work permits.137 They 
assume that workers who migrate without documents are all trafficking 
victims who should be liberated and returned home, while those who em-
ploy them should be criminally prosecuted and punished.138
Reality of course is different. “Push” effects in sending countries and 
“pull effects” in receiving countries make most undocumented migration 
voluntary, with millions of workers seeking opportunities for better lives 
than they contemplate at home.139 The challenge in the United States is to 
recognize reality and recognize the many positive contributions of immi-
135. The author asked a U.S. Department of Labor official about this in a May 2016 exchange that 
the official requested be off-the-record; the response was “we don’t know.”
136. See David Nakamura and Ylan Q. Mui, “Donald Trump promised to rip up trade deals. TPP is 
the first casualty.” WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/11/donald-trump-promised-to-rip-up-trade-
deals-tpp-is-the-first-casualty/.
137. See, e.g., ILO No. 97, supra note 2 art. 6; ILO No. 143, supra note 3 art. 10 (committing state 
to protect migrant workers “lawfully within its territory”).
138. See, e.g., ILO No. 143, supra note 3 art. 6 (committing states to “the application of adminis-
trative, civil and penal sanctions, which include imprisonment in their range, in respect of the illegal 
employment of migrant workers.”).
139. See Rachel Cassidy, Involuntary and Voluntary Migrant Estimates (2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), 
http://www.copafs.org/UserFiles/file/seminars/methodology_and_data_quality/Involuntary%20and%20
Voluntary%20Migarant%20Estimates.pdf (noting “there were 3,523,262 involuntary migrants and 
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grant workers to our economy and society, and to forge a means of regular-
izing their situation within a context of respect for human rights.
Can using a human rights frame advance this process? Extensive liter-
ature describes how diffusion of international human rights norms slowly 
permeates and changes domestic legal regimes in countries transitioning 
from dictatorship to democracy.140 Less common is analysis and advocacy 
on incorporating international standards into U.S. law and practice. But 
several knowledgeable immigration specialists have confronted this ques-
tion and offered compelling arguments for undertaking such an effort.
Kati Griffith says:
[M]igrant workers may also have some recourse in international arenas 
such as the International Labor Organization, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, and the National Office of Administration of the North 
American Agreement on Free Trade. These avenues are sometimes lim-
ited because of the failure of the United States to sign treaties that may 
be helpful to migrant workers and because the domestic enforcement of 
international standards is often difficult . . . [I]nternational bodies largely 
do not have an ability to reach specific employers in the United States. 
Even when international law cannot directly reach employers in the 
United States, however, international legal challenges often provide po-
litical pressure that may help migrant workers more broadly and interna-
tional laws can serve as a source of “aspirational law” for the future.141
Canadian colleague Judy Fudge argues:
On their face, international human rights norms offer a more promising 
avenue for protecting migrant workers from precarious employment than 
do claims based upon citizenship, a formal legal status that migrant
workers do not enjoy in the state in which they are working. Human 
rights, by contrast, are invoked and apply on the basis of humanity and 
personhood, a much broader status that does not depend upon political 
membership in the host state.142
Leslie Wexler of Illinois Law School suggests that viewing migrant 
labor policy through a human rights lens can overcome “moral disengage-
ment” by people who fail to recognize the human condition of migrants. It 
can also contribute to formation and dissemination of best practices among 
receiving countries and ultimately lead to legislative change.143
140. See, e.g., THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE
(Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
141. Griffith, supra note 23, at 154.
142. See Judy Fudge, Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment: The Paradox of 
International Rights for Migrant Workers, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 95, 96 (2012) (footnote omit-
ted).
143. See Lesley Wexler, The Non-Legal Role of International Human Rights Law in Addressing 
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Beth Lyon argues that “the U.N. Migrant Worker Convention, dis-
missed by this [the United States] and other migrant-receiving countries for 
nearly two decades as a political non-starter, provides a rational approach 
to labor migration that deserves meaningful examination by the United 
States . . . because it would inject into domestic debates the notion that 
immigrant workers, including unauthorized workers, are subjects of human 
rights protection.”144
Prof. Lyon goes on to suggest areas in which international standards 
embodied in the U.N. Convention could affect U.S. law, policy, and dis-
course:
Engaging with the Convention would shift the political cli-
mate toward policy reform by keeping human rights concerns 
front and center in discourse and debates;
Ratification of the Convention would advance foreign policy 
goals of strengthening relations with Mexico and with devel-
oping countries generally, enabling the United States to shape 
the development of emerging international law standards on 
immigrant workers;
Engaging with the Convention would educate U.S. officials 
on best practices in labor migration and promote policy coher-
ence among the many federal agencies that deal with migrant 
labor issues;
A campaign to ratify the Convention would signal a meaning-
ful shift in modality for U.S. migrant workers and their advo-
144. See Beth Lyon, The Unsigned United Nations Migrant Worker Rights Convention: An Over-
looked Opportunity to Change the “Brown Collar” Migration Paradigm, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
389, 393 (2010) [hereinafter Lyon, Brown Collar]; see also Beth Lyon, Changing Tactics: Globaliza-
tion and the U.S. Immigrant Worker Rights Movement, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 161 (2008) 
[hereinafter Lyon, Changing Tactics]; Beth Lyon, Tipping the Balance: Why Courts Should Look to 
International and Foreign Law on Unauthorized Immigrant Worker Rights, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 169 
(2007) [hereinafter Lyon, Tipping the Balance]; David Weissbrodt, Remedies for Undocumented 
Noncitizens in the Workplace: Using International Law to Narrow the Holding of Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1424 (2008); Ryszard Cholewinski, The Human and 
Labor Rights of Migrants: Visions of Equality, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 177 (Winter 2008); Rebecca 
Smith, Human Rights at Home: Human Rights as an Organizing and Legal Tool in Low-Wage Worker 
Communities, 3 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 285 (2007); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms 
on Migration: Substance without Architecture, in INT’L MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS 
AND KEY CHALLENGES 467 (Ryszard Cholewinski et al. eds., 2007); Connie de la Vega & Conchita 
Lozano, Advocates Should Use Applicable International Standards to Address Violations of Undocu-
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cates, requiring that they articulate and justify a broad range 
of international standards for domestic audiences.145
Change will be incremental. Migrant labor and human rights advo-
cates still confront general unawareness in the United States of internation-
al human rights standards and of the ILO’s work in giving precise meaning 
to those standards.146 Advocates still have an enormous educational chal-
lenge of making them more widely known and respected.
But the fact that international human rights arguments strain for a 
place in American political discourse is not a reason to shy away from their 
use. It is a reason to bring human rights into the discourse to connect with a 
natural sense of “rights” that all people share.
The human rights argument pries open more space for advocacy on 
behalf of migrant workers and for rights-based reforms. It frames advocacy 
as a human rights mission, not defending “illegal aliens” or, more mun-
danely, seeking to raise or lower the numerical cap on H-1B visas or the 
Adverse Effect Wage Rate.
D. Informing the Judiciary
One possible approach pertinent for practitioners to consider is includ-
ing international human rights arguments in complaints, trial briefs and 
appeal briefs in litigating immigrant worker cases. Consider too having 
expert witnesses testify about international standards on migrant workers.
Granted it is difficult, especially at the district court level. Applying 
U.S. law is complicated enough; introducing international law puts front-
line judges into mostly unfamiliar and uncomfortable territory. But this is 
why human rights should be raised at the trial level: so that on appeal cir-
cuit courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, can begin to fashion analyti-
cal approaches that guide lower judges and courts.
This is not so far-fetched. In Roper v. Simmons, in which the Court 
ruled unconstitutional the death penalty for juvenile offenders, Justice Scal-
ia railed against consideration of international norms, saying “the views of 
other countries and the so-called international community . . . [and the] 
argument[ ]that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world[ ]ought to be rejected out of hand.”147
145. See generally Lyon, Brown Collar, supra note 144, at 495; Lyon, Changing Tactics, supra 
note 144; Lyon, Tipping the Balance, supra note 144; Weissbrodt, supra note 144; Cholewinski, supra 
note 144; Smith, supra note 144; Aleinikoff, supra note 144; de la Vega & Lozano, supra note 144.
146. Estlund, supra note 42 at 1589–90; see also AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2005).
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But Scalia was dissenting. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion noted:
[T]he Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to internation-
al authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” . . . It is proper 
that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion 
against the juvenile death penalty . . . The opinion of the world commu-
nity, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and sig-
nificant confirmation for our own conclusions.148
Justice Breyer has elaborated on this view in a recent book, saying:
[C]ritics worry that . . . our judiciary will come to substitute foreign legal 
concepts and values for those upon which Americans have long built 
their lives . . . [T]he demands of the Court’s work make impossible the 
sort of hermetically sealed legal system some might imagine America 
able to sustain . . . [I]f potential for influence exists in our engagement 
with the legal world beyond our shores, it is far likelier to be our influ-
ence on international law . . . than foreign influence on American 
law . . . By engaging the world and the borderless challenges it presents, 
we can promote adherence to and the adoption of those basic constitu-
tional and legal values for which the Court and the Constitution 
stand . . . 149
Anti-immigrant sentiment and attacks are increasing around the 
world.150 Instead, the United States should seek to promote values suggest-
ed by Justice Breyer by applying human rights standards and principles to 
treatment of migrant workers in U.S. law and policy. Perhaps, for example, 
in a case reprising the question of remedies for migrant workers unlawfully 
fired for exercising rights of association, the Supreme Court might recon-
sider its decision in Hoffman Plastic and take into account recommenda-
tions of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.151
E. Reform Proposals
In the policy arena, the United States should consider reform measures 
that will reflect international human rights standards alongside homegrown 
148. Id. at 574, 577 (majority opinion).
149. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL 
REALITIES 246, 248 (2015).
150. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, String of Attacks in Europe Fuels a Summer of Anxiety, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/world/europe/string-of-attacks-in-europe-
fuels-a-summer-of-anxiety.html?_r=0; Dan Bilefsky, Fatal Beating of Polish Man Fuels Debate Over 
Xenophobia in Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/world/europe/britain-polish-man-killed-brexit.html.
151. See Houseman, supra note 103; Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrant 
Workers, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 1 (September 17, 2003).; 
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values that do not brand migrants as criminals and rapists,152 apply a reli-
gious test to reject migrants and refugees,153 purport to round up and deport 
eleven million people,154 or build a wall on the border with a friend and 
neighbor.155
In this light, international human rights principles compel an immigra-
tion reform plan that provides:
the application of international human rights standards to mi-
grant workers’ living and working conditions;
regularization of status and a path to citizenship for undocu-
mented migrant workers and members of their families;
safeguards against migrant labor being used to undermine 
terms and conditions of employment for all workers;
tighter control of temporary visa programs based on real 
needs, coupled with an opportunity for temporary migrants to 
obtain green cards, permanent residency, and a path toward 
citizenship;
where a genuine labor shortage exists (i.e. not one driven by 
failure to offer good pay and benefits), salary guarantees for 
migrant workers at prevailing wage levels, not artificially 
suppressed pay;
strong anti-blacklisting and anti-retaliation measures to pro-
tect migrant workers’ rights, including special visas and work 
permits to remain in the country to pursue legal recourse;
a temporary visa system that allows for free movement among 
employers, thus ending the “virtual servitude” that marks cur-
rent temporary visa programs tying the worker to one employ-
er;
152. See Alexander Burns, Choice Words from Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES: FIRST DRAFT, June 
16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/06/16/choice-words-from-donald-trump-
presidential-candidate/; S.A. Miller, Ivanka Trump Wanted to Walk back Donald Trump’s Mexican 
‘Rapists’ Comments: Deposition, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2016, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/13/ivanka-trump-wanted-walk-back-donald-trumps-
mexica/.
153. John Nichols, Bush and Cruz Want to Use Religious Tests to Bar Refugees From the US, THE
NATION Nov. 17, 2015, https://www.thenation.com/article/republicans-want-to-use-religious-tests-to-
bar-refugees-from-the-us/.
154. Brian Bennett, Can Donald Trump really round up and deport 11 million people?, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-deport-20160822-snap-
story.html.
155. Nick Gass, Conway: Trump focuses on wall because it’s ‘easy for people to understand’,
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a regulated temporary worker recruitment system ensuring 
reasonable fees, registration and vetting of recruiters, full dis-
closure and transparency, enforceable individual contracts of 
employment, document integrity, employer-paid travel ex-
penses, and making employers where migrant workers actual-
ly apply their labor legally responsible for adherence to 
international standards and legally liable for violations by re-
cruiters and their agents;156
migrant workers’ access to legal services on the same basis as 
other low-income workers;
protection of migrant workers’ full freedom of association and 
related rights to organize and to bargain collectively, includ-
ing access to the full range of remedies when they are victim-
ized by unlawful conduct.
This is an ambitious set of proposals. Achieving even a portion of 
such reforms is a huge challenge not easily met. But at a time when noisy 
political voices propose policies incorporating anti-immigrant racism, xen-
ophobia, and intolerance, advocates should “go big” in defense of human 
rights and migrant workers’ rights.
156. For details on these proposals, see Jennifer Gordon, Global Labor Recruitment in a Supply 
Chain Context (ILO Working Paper 2015), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-dgreports/—-
dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_377805.pdf.
